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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) systems are designed and
developed either as standalone applications from the
ground-up or with the help of IoT middleware platforms.
They are designed to support different kinds of scenarios,
such as smart homes and smart cities. Thus far, privacy
concerns have not been explicitly considered by IoT ap-
plications and middleware platforms. This is partly due
to the lack of systematic methods for designing privacy
that can guide the software development process in IoT.
In this paper, we propose a set of guidelines, a privacy-
by-design framework, that can be used to assess privacy
capabilities and gaps of existing IoT applications as well
as middleware platforms. We have evaluated two open
source IoT middleware platforms, namely OpenIoT and
Eclipse SmartHome, to demonstrate how our framework
can be used in this way.
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Privacy ; D.2.10 Software Engineering: Design—Method-
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Author Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) [34] is a network of physi-
cal objects or ‘things’ enabled with computing, network-
ing, or sensing capabilities which allow these objects to
collect and exchange data. To make IoT application
development easier, a variety of IoT middleware plat-
forms have been proposed and developed. TThese plat-
forms offer distributed system services that have stan-
dard programming interfaces and protocols, which help
solve problems associated with heterogeneity, distribu-
tion and scale in IoT applications development. These
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services are called ‘middleware’ as they sit ‘in the mid-
dle’, in a layer above the operating system and network-
ing software and below domain-specific applications [1].
Our proposed privacy-by-design (PbD) framework can
be used to assess both IoT applications and middleware
platforms without any changes and agnostic to their dif-
ferences. Therefore, in this paper, we use the terms ‘ap-
plication’ and ‘middleware platform’ interchangeably.
Our research is motivated by a lack of privacy protec-
tion features in both IoT applications and middleware
platforms. We also recognise that existing privacy-by-
design frameworks do not provide specific guidance that
can be used by software engineers to design IoT applica-
tions and middleware platforms. Further, recent security
and privacy breaches in IoT solutions domain (e.g., In-
ternet connected baby monitor [40]) have also motived
our research.
In recent years, many parties have built IoT mid-
dleware platforms, from large corporations (e.g., Mi-
crosoft Azure IoT) to start-ups (e.g., wso2.com, Xively),
from proprietary to open source (e.g., KAAproject.org),
and from academic organisations (e.g., OpenIoT.eu)
to broader communities (e.g., Eclipse Smart Home:
eclipse.org/smarthome). Thus far, privacy has not been
considered explicitly by any of these platforms, we be-
lieve partly due to a lack of privacy-by-design methods
for the IoT. To address this, we propose a privacy-by-
design (PbD) framework that can guide software engi-
neers to systematically assess the privacy capabilities of
IoT applications and middleware platforms. We suggest
that the proposed framework can also be used to design
new IoT platforms. However, in this paper, we only fo-
cus on assessing existing IoT platforms.
There are number of existing frameworks that have
been proposed to help elicit privacy requirements and
to design privacy capabilities in systems. The origi-
nal privacy-by-design framework was proposed by Ann
Cavoukian [3]. This framework identifies seven founda-
tional principles that should be followed when developing
privacy sensitive applications. These are: (1) proactive
not reactive; preventative not remedial, (2) privacy as
the default setting, (3) privacy embedded into design, (4)
full functionality positive-sum, not zero-sum, (5) end-to-
end security; full life-cycle protection, (6) visibility and
transparency- keep it open, and (7) respect for user pri-
vacy, keep it user-centric. These high level principles are
proposed for computer systems in general but does not
provide enough details to be adopted by software engi-
neers when designing and developing IoT applications.
Building on the ideas of engineering privacy-by-
architecture vs. privacy-by-policy presented by Spiek-
erman and Cranor [39], Hoepman [20] proposes an ap-
proach that identifies eight specific privacy design strate-
gies: minimise, hide, separate, aggregate, inform, con-
trol, enforce, and demonstrate. This is in contrast to
other approaches that we considered. In a similar vein,
LINDDUN [11] is a privacy threat analysis framework
that uses data flow diagrams (DFD) to identify privacy
threats. It consists of six specific methodological steps:
define the DFD, map privacy threats to DFD elements,
Identify threat scenarios, prioritise threats, elicit mitiga-
tion strategies, and select corresponding privacy enhanc-
ing technologies. However, both LINDDUN and Hoep-
man’s framework are not aimed at the IoT domain. Fur-
ther, they not prescriptive enough in guiding software
engineers.
In contrast, the STRIDE [21] framework was developed
to help software engineers consider security threats, it is
an example framework that has been successfully used
to build secure software systems by industry. It suggests
six different threat categories: spoofing of user identity,
tampering, repudiation, information disclosure (privacy
breach or data leak), denial of service, and elevation of
privilege. However, its focus is mostly on security rather
than privacy concerns.
On the other hand, designing IoT applications is much
more difficult than designing desktop, mobile, or web
applications [32]. This is beacause a typical IoT appli-
cation requires both software and hardware (e.g., sen-
sors) to work together on multiple heterogeneous nodes
with different capabilities under different conditions [30].
Assessing an IoT application in order to find privacy
gaps is a complex task that requires systematic guid-
ance. For these reasons, we believe that IoT development
would benefit from having a privacy-by-design frame-
work that can systematically guide software engineers to
assess (and potentially design new) IoT applications and
middleware platforms. Typically, systematic guidelines
will generate a consistent result irrespective of who car-
ried out a given assessment. Such a framework will also
reduce the time taken to assess a given application or
platform.
INTERNET OF THINGS: DATA FLOW
In this section, we briefly discuss how data flows in a
typical IoT application that follows a centralised archi-
tecture pattern [38]. This helps us to introduce privacy
guidelines and their applicability to different types of
computational nodes and data life-cycle phases. As il-
lustrated in Figure 1, in IoT applications, data moves
from sensing devices to gateway devices to a cloud in-
frastructure [30]. This is the most common architecture,
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Figure 1: Typical data flow in IoT Applications
also called centralised architecture, used in IoT applica-
tion development [38]. Each of these devices have differ-
ent computational capabilities. They also have different
types of access to energy sources from permanent to so-
lar power to battery power. Further, depending on the
availability of knowledge, each device may have limita-
tions as to the type of data processing that can be done.
An IoT application should integrate all these different
types of devices with different capabilities. We believe
that IoT middleware platforms should provide in-built
privacy protection capabilities. As a result, IoT appli-
cation developers will be able to easily use middleware
platforms to achieve their own objectives while protect-
ing user privacy.
We divided the data life cycle into five phases in order to
structure our discussion. Within each device (also called
node), data moves through five data life cycle phases:
Consent and Data Acquisition [CDA], Data Preprocess-
ing [DPP], Data Processing and Analysis [DPA], Data
Storage [DS] and Data Dissemination [DD]. The CDA
phase comprises routing and data reading activities by
a certain node. DPP describes any type of processing
performed on raw data to prepare it for another pro-
cessing procedure [36]. DPA is, broadly, “the collection
and manipulation of items of data to produce meaning-
ful information” [15]. DS is the storage of raw data of
processed information for later retrieval and DD is the
transmission of data to an external party.
We assume that all the data life cycle phases are present
in all nodes in an IoT application to be utilised by soft-
ware engineers to protect user privacy. However, based
on the decisions taken by the engineers, some data life
cycle phases in some nodes may not be utilised. For
example, a sensor node may utilise the DPP phase to
average temperature data. Then, without using both
DPA and DS phases to analyse or store data (due to
hardware and energy constraints) the sensor node may
push the averaged data to the gateway node in the DD
phase.
PRIVACY-BY-DESIGN GUIDELINES
After reviewing existing privacy design frameworks, we
determined that Hoepman’s [20] is the most appropriate
starting point for developing a more detailed privacy-
by-design framework for IoT. Additionally, Hoepman’s
design strategies helps us to organise and structure our
paper [31]. In this section, we derive privacy-by-design
guidelines by examining Hoepman’s eight design strate-
gies. These guidelines are not fool-proof recommenda-
tions that can be used without careful thought and con-
sideration of the specific objectives, implementations, ex-
ecution, and other factors specific to each IoT applica-
tion or middleware platform.
It is important to note that our proposed guidelines
should not be used to compare different IoT applica-
tion or platforms. The primary reason is that each IoT
application or platforms is designed to serve a specific
purpose or category of application. For example, the
SmartHome (eclipse.org) platform is designed to act as
a home hub to enable sensing and actuation within a
household environment. In contrast, OpenIoT [22] is
designed to act as a cloud middleware for smart city
applications. Therefore, they are not comparable plat-
forms. However, if the platforms in question are very
similar in terms of intended functionality, our guidelines
can be used to compare them from a privacy perspective
with the intention of selecting one over the other.
We developed these guidelines to act as a framework
to support software engineers, so they can adopt our
guidelines into their IoT applications in a customised
manner. For example, certain applications will require
aggregation of data from different sources to discover
new knowledge (i.e. new pieces of information). We do
not discourage such approaches as long as data is ac-
quired through proper consent processes. However, IoT
applications, at all times, should take all possible mea-
sures to achieve their goals with the minimum amount
of data. This means that out of eight privacy design
strategies proposed by Hoepman’s [20], minimisation is
the most important strategy. These guidelines are de-
rived through analysis of literature and use-cases.
The relationship between Hoepman’s [20] design strate-
gies and our guidelines are presented in Table 1. Broadly,
we have identified two major privacy risks, namely, sec-
ondary usage (⊗) and unauthorised access (⊖) that
would arise as consequences of not following guidelines.
The usage of already collected data for purposes that
were not initially consented by the data owners can be
identified as secondary usage [26]. Secondary usage can
lead to privacy violations. Unauthorised access is when
someone gains access to data without proper authorisa-
tion during any phase of the data life cycle. We will
use the symbols shown above to denote which threat is
relevant to each guideline.
Minimise data acquisition [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline suggests to minimise the amount of data
collected or requested by an IoT application [13]. Min-
imisation includes minimising data types (e.g., energy
consumption, water consumption, temperature), mini-
mum duration (e.g., hours, days, weeks, months), and
minimum frequency (i.e., sampling rate) (e.g., one sec-
ond, 30 seconds, minutes).
Minimise number of data sources [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline suggests to minimise the number of data
sources used by an IoT application. Depending on the
application, it may be required to collect data from dif-
ferent sources. Each data source may hold information
about an individual (e.g., Databox [4]). Alternatively,
multiple data sources may hold pieces of information
about a person [6] (e.g., Fitbit activity tracking service
may hold an person’s activity data while a hospital may
hold his health records). Aggregation of data from multi-
ple sources allow third parties to identify personal details
that could lead to privacy violations (e.g., aggregating
medical records and activity data).
Minimise raw data intake [(⊗) (⊖)]
Wherever possible, IoT applications should reduce the
amount of raw1 data acquired by the system [33]. Raw
data could lead to secondary usage and privacy viola-
tion. Therefore, IoT platforms should consider convert-
ing raw data into secondary context data [34]. For ex-
ample, IoT applications can generate orientation (e.g.,
sitting, standing, walking) by processing accelerometer
data, storing only the results (i.e. secondary context)
and discarding the raw accelerometer values.
Minimise knowledge discovery [(⊗)]
This guideline suggests to minimise the amount of knowl-
edge discovered within an IoT application [2]. IoT ap-
plications should only discover the knowledge necessary
to achieve their primary objectives. For example, if the
objective is to recommend food plans, it should not at-
tempt to infer users’ health status without their explicit
permission.
Minimise data storage [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline suggests to minimise the amount of data
(i.e. primary or secondary) stored by an IoT application
[39]. Any piece of data that is not required to perform
a certain task should be deleted. For example, raw data
can be deleted once secondary contexts are derived. Fur-
ther, personally identifiable data need not be stored.
Minimise data retention period [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline suggests to minimise the duration for
which data is stored (i.e. avoid retaining data for longer
than it is needed) [23]. Long retention periods provide
more time for malicious parties to attempt unauthorised
access to the data. Privacy risks are also increased be-
cause long retention periods could lead to unconsented
secondary usage.
1Unprocessed and un-fused data can be identified as Raw
data (also called primary context [34]). For example, X-axis
value of an accelerometer can be identified as raw data.
Knowledge (e.g. current activity = ‘walking’) generated by
processing and fusing X-, Y-, and Z-axis values together can
be identified as processed data (also called secondary con-
text [34]).
Hidden data routing [(⊖)]
In the IoT, data is generated within sensor nodes. The
data analysis typically happens within cloud servers.
Therefore, data is expected to travel between differ-
ent types of computational nodes before arriving at the
processing cloud servers. This type of routing reveals
a user’s location and usage from anyone conducting
network surveillance or traffic analysis. To makes it
more difficult for Internet activities to be traced back
to the user, this guideline suggests that IoT applications
should support and employ anonymous routing mecha-
nisms (e.g., Tor [24]).
Data anonymisation [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline suggests to remove personally identifiable
information before the data gets used by the IoT appli-
cation so that the people described by the data remain
anonymous. Removal of personally identifiable informa-
tion reduces the risk of unintended disclosure and privacy
violations [12].
Encrypted data communication [(⊖)]
This guideline suggests that different components in an
IoT application should consider encrypted data commu-
nication wherever possible [16]. Encrypted data com-
munication would reduce the potential privacy risks
due to unauthorised access during data transfer be-
tween components. There are multiple data commu-
nication approaches based on the components involved
in an IoT application, namely, 1) device-to-device, 2)
device-to-gateway, 3) device-to-cloud, and 4) gateway-
to-cloud. Sensor data communication can be encrypted
using symmetric encryption AES 256 [8] in the applica-
tion layer. Typically, device-to-device communications
are encrypted at the link layer using special electronic
hardware included in the radio modules [16]. Gateway-
to-cloud communication is typically secured through
HTTPS using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport
Layer Security (TLS).
Encrypted data processing [(⊖)]
This guideline suggests to process data while encrypted.
Encryption is the process of encoding data in such a
way that only authorised parties can read it. However,
sometimes, the party who is responsible for processing
data should not be allowed to read data. In such cir-
cumstances, it is important to process data in encrypted
form. For example, homomorphic encryption [14] is a
form of encryption that allows computations to be car-
ried out on cipher-text, thus generating an encrypted
result which, when decrypted, matches the result of op-
erations performed on the plain-text [17] .
Encrypted data storage [(⊖)]
This guideline suggests that IoT applications should
store data in encrypted form [5]. Encrypted data stor-
age reduces any privacy violation due to malicious at-
tacks and unauthorised access. Data encryption can be
applied at different levels from sensors [18] to the cloud.
Depending on the circumstances, data can be encrypted
using both hardware and software technologies.
Reduce data granularity [(⊗)]
The granularity is the level of depth represented by the
data. High granularity refers to an atomic grade of detail
and low granularity zooms out into a summary view of
data [28]. For example, dissemination of location can be
considered as coarse-grained and full address can be con-
sidered as fine-grained. Therefore, releasing fine grained
information always has more privacy risks than coarse-
grained data as they contain more information. Data
granularity has a direct impact on the quality of the
data as well as the accuracy of the results produced by
processing such data [41]. IoT applications should re-
quest the minimum level of granularity that is required
to perform their primary tasks. Higher level of granu-
larity could lead to secondary data usage and eventually
privacy violations.
Query answering [(⊗)]
This guideline suggests to release high-level answers to
queris when disseminating information, without releas-
ing raw data. For example, a sample query would be
‘how energy efficient a particular household is?’ where
the answer would usa a 0-5 scale. Raw data can al-
ways lead to privacy violations due to secondary usage.
One such implementation is openPDS/SafeAnswers [10]
which allows users to collect, store, and give high level
answers to the queries while protecting their privacy.
Repeated query blocking [(⊗)]
This guideline goes hand-in-hand with the Query an-
swering guideline. When answering queries, IoT appli-
cations need to make sure that they block any malicious
attempts to discover knowledge that violates user pri-
vacy through repeated queries (e.g., analysing intersec-
tions of multiple results) [35].
Distributed data processing [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline suggests that an IoT application should
process data in a distributed manner. Similar, ap-
proaches are widely used in the wireless sensor network
domain [37]. Distributed processing avoids centralised
large-scale data gathering. As a result, it deters any
unauthorised data access attempts. Different types of
distributed IoT architectures are discussed in [38].
Distributed data storage [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline recommends storing data in a distributed
manner [29]. Distributed data storage reduces any pri-
vacy violation due to malicious attacks and unauthorised
access. It also reduces privacy risks due to unconsented
secondary knowledge discovery.
Knowledge discovery based aggregation [(⊗)]
Aggregation of information over groups of attributes or
groups of individuals, restricts the amount of detail in
the personal data that remains [20]. This guideline sug-
gests to discover knowledge though aggregation and re-
place raw data with discovered new knowledge. For ex-
ample, ‘majority of people who visited the park on [par-
ticular date] were young students’ is an aggregated re-
sult that is sufficient (once collected over a time period)
to perform further time series based sales performance
analysis of a near-by shop. Exact timings of the crowd
movements are not necessary to achieve this objective.
Geography based aggregation [(⊗)]
This guideline recommends to aggregate data using ge-
ographical boundaries [27]. For example, a query would
be ‘how many electric vehicles used in each city in UK’.
The results to this query would be an aggregated num-
ber unique to the each city. It is not required to collect
or store details about individual electric vehicles.
Chain aggregation [(⊗)]
This guideline suggests to perform aggregation on-the-go
while moving data from one node to another. For exam-
ple, if the query requires a count or average, this can be
done without pulling all the data items to a centralised
location. Data will be sent from one node to another
until all the nodes get a chance to respond. Similar tech-
niques are successfully used in wireless sensor networks
[25]. This type of technique reduces the amount of data
gathered by a centralised node (e.g., cloud server). Fur-
ther, such aggregation also eliminates raw data from the
results, thus reducing the risk of secondary data usage.
Time-Period based aggregation [(⊗)]
This guideline suggests to aggregate data over time (e.g.,
days, week, months) [9]. This reduces the granularity of
data and also reduces the secondary usage that could
lead to privacy violations. For example, energy con-
sumption of a given house can be acquired and repre-
sented in aggregated form as 160 kWh per month instead
of on a daily or hourly basis.
Category based aggregation [(⊗)]
Categorisation based aggregation approaches can be
used to reduce the granularity of the raw data [9]. For
example, instead of using exact value (e.g., 160 kWh per
month), energy consumption of a given house can be
represented as 150-200 kWh per month. Time-Period
based and category based aggregation can be combined
together to reduce data granularity.
Information Disclosure [(⊗)]
This guideline suggests that data subjects should be ad-
equately informed whenever data they own is acquired,
processed, and disseminated. The ’Inform’ step can
take place at any stage of the data life cycle and can
be broadly divided into two categories: pre-inform and
post-inform. Pre-inform takes place before data enters
to a given data life cycle phase. Post-inform takes place
soon after data leaves a given data life cycle phase [19].
• Consent and Data Acquisition: what is the purpose
of the data acquisition?, What types of data are re-
quested?, What is the level of granularity?, What are
the rights of the data subjects?
• Data Pre-Processing: what data will be taken into the
platform?, what data will be thrown out?, what kind
of pre-processing technique will be employed?, what
are the purposes of pre-processing data?, what tech-
niques will be used to protect user privacy?
• Data Processing and Analysis: what type of data will
be analysed?, what knowledge will be discovered?,
what techniques will be used?.
• Data Storage: what data items will be stored? how
long they will be stored? what technologies are used
to store data (e.g. encryption techniques)? is it cen-
tralised or distributed storage? will there be any back
up processes?
• Data Dissemination: with whom the data will be
shared? what rights will receivers have? what rights
will data subjects have?
Control [(⊗)]
This guideline recommends providing privacy control
mechanisms for data subjects [9]. Control mechanisms
will allow data owners to manage data based on their
preference. There are different aspects that the data
owner may like to control. However, controlling is a time
consuming task and not every data owner will have the
expertise to make such decisions.
Therefore, it is a software engineer’s responsibility to
determine the kind of controls that are useful to data
owners in a given IoT application context. Further, it is
important to provide some kind of default set of options
for data owners to choose from, specially in the cases
where data subjects do not have sufficient knowledge.
Some potential aspects of control are 1) data granularity,
2) anonymisation technique, 3) data retention period, 4)
data dissemination.
Logging [(⊗) (⊖)]
This guideline suggests to log events during all phases [9].
It allows both internal and external parties to examine
what has happened in the past to make sure a given sys-
tem has performed as promised. Logging could include
but is not limited to event traces, performance parame-
ters, timestamps, sequences of operations performed over
data, any human interventions. For example, a log may
include the timestamps of data arrival, operations per-
formed in order to anonymise data, aggregation tech-
niques performed, and so on.
Auditing
This guideline suggests to perform systematic and in-
dependent examinations of logs, procedures, processes,
hardware and software specifications, and so on [9]. The
logs above could play a significant role in this process.
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[13] 1-Minimise data acquisition X X X X ⊗ ⊖
[6] 2-Minimise number of data sources X X ⊗ ⊖
[33] 3-Minimise raw data intake X X X X ⊗ ⊖
[2] 4-Minimize knowledge discovery X X ⊗
[39] 5-Minimize data storage X X ⊗ ⊖
[23] 6-Minimize data retention period X X X ⊗ ⊖
[24] 7-Hidden data routing X X X ⊗ ⊖
[12] 8-Data anonymization X X X X X ⊗ ⊖
[16] [8] 9-Encrypted data communication X X X ⊗ ⊖
[14] [17] 10-Encrypted data processing X X X ⊗ ⊖
[5] [18] 11-Encrypted data storage X ⊗ ⊖
[41] 12-Reduce data granularity X X X X ⊗
[10] 13-Query answering X X X ⊗
[35] 14-Repeated query blocking X X X ⊗
[37] [38] 15-Distributed data processing X X ⊗ ⊖
[29] 16-Distributed data storage X X ⊗ ⊖
[20] 17-Knowledge discovery X X X X X X ⊗
[27] 18-Geography based aggregation X X X X X X ⊗
[25] 19-Chain aggregation X X X X X X ⊗
[9] 20-Time-Period based aggregation X X X X X X ⊗
[9] 21-Category based aggregation X X X X X X ⊗
[19] 22-Information Disclosure X X X X X X X ⊗
[9] 23-Control X X X X X X X ⊗
[9] 24-Logging X X X X X X ⊗ ⊖
[9] 25-Auditing X
26-Open Source X
27-Data Flow X
[42] 28-Certification X
[7] 29-Standardization X
[9] 30-Compliance X ⊗ ⊖
Risk Types: Secondary Usage (⊗), Unauthorised Access (⊖)
Non-disclosure agreements may be helpful to allow audit-
ing some parts of the classified data analytics processes.
Open Source
Making source code of an IoT application open allows
any external party to review code. Such reviews can be
used as a form of compliance demonstration. This allows
external parties to verify and determine whether a given
application or platform has taken sufficient measures to
protect user privacy.
Data Flow
Data flow diagrams (e.g., Data Flow Diagrams used by
Unified Modelling Language) allow interested parties to
understand how data flows within a given IoT applica-
tion and how data is being treated. Therefore, DFDs
can be used as a form of a compliance demonstration.
Certification
In this context, certification refers to the confirmation of
certain characteristics of an system and process. Typi-
cally, certifications are given by a neutral authority. Cer-
tification will add trustworthiness to IoT applications.
TRUSTe (truste.com) [42] Privacy Seal is one example,
even though none of the existing certifications are ex-
plicitly designed to certify IoT applications.
Standardisation
This guideline suggests to follow standard practices as a
way to demonstrate privacy protection capabilities. In-
dustry wide standards (e.g. AllJoyn allseenalliance.org)
typically inherit security measures that would reduce
some privacy risks as well. This refers to the process of
implementing and developing technical standards. Stan-
dardisation can help to maximise compatibility, interop-
erability, safety, repeatability, or quality. Standardisa-
tion will help external parties to easily understand the
inner workings of a given IoT application [7].
Compliance [(⊗) (⊖)]
Based on the country and region, there are number of
policies, laws and regulations that need to be adhered to.
It is important for IoT applications to respect guidelines.
Some regulatory efforts are ISO 29100 Privacy frame-
work, OECD privacy principles, and European Commis-
sion Protection of personal data.
EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate how our proposed PbD
framework can be used to evaluate existing IoT appli-
cations and platforms in order to find gaps in privacy.
For evaluation, we used two open source IoT platforms
that have been developed to accomplish different goals.
We intentionally selected two IoT platforms instead of
IoT applications due to their open source nature and
availability to the research community.
The OpenIoT [22] middleware infrastructure supports
flexible configuration and deployment of algorithms
for collecting, and filtering information streams stem-
ming from internet-connected objects, while at the
same time generating and processing important busi-
ness/application events. It is more focused on enterprise
and industrial IoT applications.
Eclipse Smart Home (eclipse.org/smarthome) is a mid-
dleware platform for integrating different home automa-
tion systems and technologies into one single solution
that allows over-arching automation rules and uniform
user interfaces. It allows building smart home solutions
that have a strong focus on heterogeneous environments.
As the name implies, it mainly focused on smart home
(or smart office) based solutions.
Methodology
Here we provide a step-by-step description of how our
proposed privacy-by-design framework can be used to
assess IoT applications and middleware platforms. In
this work, we only focus on assessing two IoT platforms,
even though the proposed framework can also support
designing brand new IoT applications and middleware
platforms as well. We believe the following method helps
software engineers to efficiently and effectively use our
framework, although this is not the only way to do so.
• Step 1: First, software engineers need to identify how
data flows in the existing system. The objective is
to identify the physical devices through which data
transits at runtime. However, only the categories of
devices need to be identified. This is a decision that
software engineers need to make. An example layout
is show in Figure 2, where we have illustrated two
different gateway devices to highlight the fact that we
are only interested in categories of devices. Device
category is typically based on the similarities in terms
of computational capabilities (e.g., CPU, RAM, etc.).
• Step 2: Build a table for each node where columns
represent data life cycle phases and rows represent
each privacy-by-design guideline. In this paper, our
aim is to assess two IoT middleware platforms that
are designed to be hosted in an server node. We
required only one table for each assessment2. How-
ever, when assessing an IoT application, there could
be many nodes involved. In such situations, a table
(e.g., Table 2) is required for each node.
• Step 3: Finally, software engineers go through each
guideline and use the colour codes proposed below to
assess their platforms. We conducted our own assess-
ment using this approach and results are presented
in Table 2. A software engineer may write notes to
justify their decisions (i.e. choice of color) as well
as to clarify the rationale on each cell. For example,
encrypted data processing may not be possible to per-
form in certain categories of devices such as gateways
due to their lack of computational resources . Such
notes are useful when working as a team so everyone
knows the rationale behind design choices.
Our proposed color coding is as follows: When a
particular guideline is not applicable for a given life
cycle phase, it is marked as NOT-APPLICABLE
( ). If a particular guideline if fully supported by
a given IoT application or platform, it is marked
as FULLY-SUPPORTED ( ). This means that the
2Two independent assessment tables are merged due to space
limitations
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Figure 2: Evaluation Methodology
platform has already taken steps to protect user
privacy as explained in the principles. If a particular
guideline is not supported at all or it requires sub-
stantial effort to support a certain functionality, it
is marked as NO-SUPPORT ( ). This means that
the platform has not taken necessary the steps to
protect user privacy as explained in the guideline
and it is either impossible or requires significant
effort to fix this. When a certain guideline is not
supported by a platform but provides a mechanism
(e.g., plug-in architecture) to support user privacy
protection through extensions, we identify them as
EXTENDIBLE ( ).
Discussion
Here we discuss a few of our guidelines to demonstrate
how a software engineer may use our framework to eval-
uate their IoT applications from a privacy perspective.
Our intention is not to discuss and justify how we eval-
uated both platforms against each guideline, but to ex-
emplify the thought processes behind this evaluation.
Let us consider guideline #1 (Minimize Data Acquisi-
tion). This guideline can be satisfied by extending both
OpenIoT and Eclipse SmartHome platform in the CDA
phases. OpenIoT has a plug-in architecture called ‘wrap-
pers’ [22]. SmartHome also has similar architecture
called ‘bundles’. These plug-ins can be easily extended
to request minimum amount of data. However, such
functionality is not readily available in these platforms.
Therefore, we marked CDA phase as EXTENDIBLE ( ).
The minimize data acquisition function is readily avail-
able in OpenIoT [22] in the DPP phases. It provides
a mechanism to configure parameters such as ‘sampling
rate’ using a declarative language. Therefore we marked
OpenIoT’s DPP phase as Fully Supported ( ). However,
no similar functionality is provided in the SmartHome
platform.
The guidelines #25 which focused on Auditing is marked
as NO-SUPPORT ( ) for both platforms. The reason is
that, though both platforms are open source, neither of
them are audited from a privacy perspective. Due to
their open source nature, code bases are regularly re-
viewed and audited to make sure coding standards are
met. However, privacy aspects are not reviewed in cur-
rent auditing sessions. We conducted similar examina-
tions with respect to all guidelines.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented set of guidelines, as the core
of a conceptual framework, that incorporates privacy-
by-design principles to guide software engineers in the
systematic assessment of the privacy capabilities of In-
ternet of Things applications and platforms. We demon-
strated how our framework can be used to assess two
open source IoT platforms namely, Eclipse Smart Home
and OpenIoT. We also explained the step by step pro-
cess of how to use our framework efficiently. The pro-
posed summarizing technique may be helpful when soft-
ware engineers need to report current statuses of their
IoT applications from a privacy perspective and justify
Table 2: Summarized Privacy Gaps Assessment for (a) Eclipse SmartHome and (b) OpenIoT
(a) Eclipse SmartHome Platform (b) OpenIoT Platform
CDA DPP DPA DS DD CDA DPP DPA DS DD
1-Minimise data acquisition
2-Minimise number of data sources
3-Minimise raw data intake
4-Minimize knowledge discovery
5-Minimize data storage
6-Minimize data retention period
7-Hidden data routing
8-Data anonymization
9-Encrypted data communication
10-Encrypted data processing
11-Encrypted data storage
12-Reduce data granularity
13-Query answering
14-Repeated query blocking
15-Distributed data processing
16-Distributed data storage
17-Knowledge discovery based aggregation
18-Geography based aggregation
19-Chain aggregation
20-Time-Period based aggregation
21-Category based aggregation
22-Information Disclosure
23-Control
24-Logging
25-Auditing
26-Open Source
27-Data Flow Diagrams
28-Certification
29-Standardization
30-Compliance
investments towards certain privacy features. Further,
detailed analysis of privacy gaps will help software en-
gineers to share their thought processes with colleagues
towards design and development of new privacy features.
In the future, we will conduct empirical studies by re-
cruiting software engineers to assess the privacy capa-
bilities of open source IoT platforms with and without
using our framework. Such studies will help us to derive
more insights on its value in real-world settings. Fur-
ther, through empirical studies, we will explore how our
framework may be used by non specialised IT profession-
als (e.g., final year students, new software engineering
graduates) to assess the existing privacy capabilities of
IoT middleware frameworks.
We also plan to demonstrate how our framework can
be used to design brand new IoT applications and plat-
forms. Specifically, we will ask participants to design
IoT applications to satisfy few different use case scenar-
ios with and without our guidelines. We will measure
the effectiveness of their designs using quantitative tech-
niques. Furthermore, to help software engineers better,
we are also planning to extract, design and document
privacy patterns that can be easily adopted into IoT ap-
plication design processes.
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